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BRIEF OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESSMACHINES
CORPORATION
As AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
~
OF NEITHER PARTY

International
Business Machines Corporation (IBM)
respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae in support
of neither party.
INTEREST

OF AMICUS CURIAE

IBM is a globally recognized leader in the field of
information technology research, development, design,
manufacturing, and related services. During IBM’s nearly
100-year history, its employees have included five Nobel
laureates, five National Medalof Science recipients, and eight
winners of the National Medal of Technology. The United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has granted
IBMtens of thousands of United States patents, including
more patents than any other corporate assignee for the past
twelve years. IBMis the proprietor of more patents claiming
computer-related inventions than any other entity in the
world. IBMis also ranked in the top two for patents issued
on business methods, as classified
by the USPTO.2 IBM
believes it can provide a balanced view on important issues
implicated by this case -- namely, the patentability standard
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and particularly
as it relates to
patenting of business methods.
1 In accordance with SupremeCourt Rule 37.6, Amicusstates
that this brief wasauthoredin its entirety by the counsellisted herein.
No person or entity other than Amicuslisted on the cover madea
monetarycontribution to the preparation or submissionof this brief.
Letters reflecting written consent of the parties to the submissionof
this brief havebeenfiled with the Clerk of the Court.

2 Accordingto informationavailable to IBM,it has been issued
308 patents on business methodsas of December13, 2005.

As a leading recipient, licensee, and licensor of patents,
amicus IBMis committedto maintaining the integrity of the
United States patent laws. IBMis particularly interested in
assuring that the statutory standard (35 U.S.C. § 101) for
patent eligibility of business methods is addressed in a
mannerthat is both rational and consistent with established
principles of patent law.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARYOF ARGUMENT
Since this Court last interpreted section 101of the patent
statute, see Diamondv. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981),
certain decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of Appealshave
broadened the scope of subject matter deemedeligible for
patenting, particularly in the area of business methods.Under
the standard currently followed by the Federal Circuit, an
invention is eligible for patenting if "it merely achieves a
useful, concrete, and tangible result." State Street Bank&
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group,Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998). Underthis lenient standard, the section 101
inquiry has taken an "end-justifies-the-means" approach,
whichhas resulted in patents arising from a diverse range of
humanbehavior traditionally outside the realm of patent
protection, including economicanalyses, artistic techniques,
athletic skills, and abstract methodsof doing business. As
one Federal Circuit jurist remarked, under that court’s case
law, "virtually anything is patentable." HughesAircraft Co.
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1385, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Clevenger, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing) (citing
State Street, 149 E3d 1368).
Despitethe significance of the issues surroundingsubject
matter eligibility under section 101, particularly for business
methods, IBMbelieves that the facts of this case do not
present a suitable opportunity for analyzing and articulating
the proper scope of subject matter for patent eligibility. The
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present matter before the Court involves a medicaldiagnostic
procedure, rather than an inchoate business methodor other
abstract technique. Moreover, the parties did not squarely
address the section 101 issue below and the resulting record
is thus not sufficiently developedwith respect to the statutory
subject matter inquiry. IBMtherefore respectfully suggests
that the Court not speak broadly to the issue of patentable
subject matter, but rather await a moreappropriate case to
address this issue. Should, however, the Court decide to
address the scope of subject matter eligibility for business
methods, IBMwishes to provide its view on section 101 for
the Court’s consideration.
As a general matter, a robust notion of patentable subject
matter best serves the United States in the twenty-first
century. Within our innovation-driven economy, diverse
industries have contributed numeroustechnical advances that
are unquestionably suitable for patenting. The USPTO
has,
for example, appropriately
awarded patents in the
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, computer/electronics,
biomedical, financial, mechanicaland other important fields.
Unfortunately,decisions of the Federal Circuit (like State
Street) have unduly expandedthe scope of patent-eligible
subject matter for business methods.This broad scope stands
at odds with the Constitution and this Court’s consistent
statements that an invention must contribute to the "Progress
of [the]... useful Arts" in order to be eligible for patenting.
In that constitutional context, patentable advances must be
tied to a particular machineor apparatus, or alternatively,
must reside in the physical transformation of an article to a
"different state or thing." See Gottschalkv. Benson,409 U.S.
63, 70-71 (1972). The State Street standard overlooks this
Court’s precedent and fails to apply an important constraint
uponthe patent system without any doctrinal justification or
alternative temperingprinciple.
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In the absence of a compelling rationale to alter the
understanding of "useful arts," IBMbelieves that this Court
should reaffirm its existing standard for subject matter
patentability which is restricted to inventions that involve
technological contributions -- namely, tangible products or
processes that either (i) are tied to a particular machine
apparatus or (ii) cause transformation or reduction of
article to a different state or thing, and in either instance
produce technologically beneficial results. IBMrecognizes
that the Court has previously used language suggesting that
this standard maynot be a rigid rule, but rather moreakin to
a presumption.In the intervening years, however,no situation
has been presented to this Court which warrants any
exception to this rule. This test sets forth a reasonable and
balancedstandard for subject matter eligibility.
The long-standing principles governing subject matter
eligible for patenting should be maintained such that, for
example, a methodof painting a surface using the posterior
of an infant (U.S. Pat. No. 6,213,778) and a method for
making jury selection determinations (U.S. Pat. No.
6,607,389) are not patentable subject matter because they
do not produce technologically beneficial results. IBM
recognizes that someof its ownbusiness methodpatents may
include claims that might not satisfy this standard.
The Federal Circuit accomplished its shift in patent
policy without any evidence suggesting that incentives for
innovation are currently needed with respect to abstract
business methodsand other non-technological innovations,
and without due consideration of the impact that such a shift
would have on the economy. Although no persuasive
justification
prompted the abrupt allowance -- indeed
explosion -- of patents for abstract business methods, the
breadth of coverage of such patents has raised significant
concerns within the innovation community. Amongthem is
concern that such patents, because they are not restricted to

a specific technologicalcontribution,mayeffectively appropriate
all conceivable solutions to a particular problem. Such an
overbroad monopolythwarts progress of the useful arts by
precluding legitimate attempts to design arounda patent and by
providing unjustified rewards beyondthe contribution of the
inventor. As a result, should this Court speak to the issue of
statutory subject matter beyondthe facts of this case, IBM
respectfully suggeststhat the Courtshouldreaffirm, consistent
with its precedent on section 101, that a technological
contributionis requiredfor subject matterpatentability, thereby
denying patents on abstract or non-technological business
methods.
DIVERSE INDUSTRIES HAVE MADETECHNICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS THAT APPROPRIATELYFALL
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF PATENTABLESUBJECT
MATTER
Throughoutour history, the constitutional and statutory
standardfor patent-eligible subject matter has beensufficiently
flexible to adapt to newtechnologicalinnovations.For example,
during the Industrial Revolution, the Court in Cochranev.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 781,791 (1877), held that an improved
methodfor manufacturingflour was patentable. Morerecently,
in Diamond
v. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980), the Court
held that a new life form, a microbe capable of digesting
petrochemicals,waspatentable. At the dawnof the Information
Age, the Court held that a claim directed to a chemicalprocess
which included a programmed
digital computerwaspatentable.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-93. The USPTO
has heededthe Court’s
direction, allowingpatents on, inter alia, newpharmaceutical,
biotechnology and financial services inventions. 3 IBMfully
supports a robust scope of patentable subject matter for these
3 See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 6,969,531 ("Sodium Hyaluronate
Microsphere), 6,967,096 ("Thermostable Peptisade") and 6,606,606
("Systems and Methods for Performing Integrated
Financial
Transaction").
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and other important innovations which are rooted in
technological contributions. Further, IBMrecognizes that the
patent system’sability to adapt to newtechnologiesis consistent
with the constitutional requirementof promotingthe useful arts
and, in particular, that a measuredevolution of the scope of
patentable subject matter is an importantincentive for pioneering
innovations.
Turningto the recent burst of business methodpatents and
the significance of the issues surrounding subject matter
eligibility of business methods,IBMbelieves that the facts of
this case do not presenta suitable predicatefor broadlyanalyzing
and articulating the proper scopeof subject matter patentability
under section 101. First, while IBMexpresses no view on the
merits of this case, the present matter before the Courtinvolves
a medicaldiagnostic procedure,4 rather than an inchoatebusiness
methodor other abstract technique.Second,the petitioner failed
to preserve the issue of patentable subject matter in the lower
courts or developa completerecordfor its review.Thepetitioner
did not, either at trial or on appeal,challengethe validity of the
patent as being directed to non-statutory subject matter?
While the question on which certiorari was granted is
narrower than that posed to the Government,6 IBMsubmits
4 The patent is directed to methodsfor assaying samples of body
tissues to determine total homocysteine levels and methods for
diagnosing vitamin B deficiency based on the elevated homocysteine
levels. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658, col. 3, 11.6-62.
5 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-12,
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2005) (No. 04-607).
6 Whenthe petition for certiorari

was pending, this Court asked

for the Government’sviews on the following question: "Is the patent
invalid because one cannot patent ’laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas’? Diamondv. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)."
Lab. Corp. of Am.Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 125 Sup. Ct. 1413

(2005).

this brief to address the subject of patent eligibility under
section 101, particularly for business methods, in the event
the Court decides to undertake a broad review of subject
matter patentability.
II. THE SCOPE OFPATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
HAS BEEN EXPANDED BEYOND THE LIMITS
ESTABLISHED BY TIlE CONSTITUTION AND
THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT
The Constitution And This Court’s Precedent
Establish Limits Upon The Subject Matter
Eligible For Patenting
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides:
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.
U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See THEFEDERALIST
NO.XLIII,
at 294 (James Madison)(M. Walter Dunne1901) ("The
to useful inventions.., belong to the inventors."). Historical
context confirms that the Constitution restricts the scope of
patent eligible subject matter. For example, the English
Statute of Monopoliesof 1623, upon which the United States
patent system is largely based, provided an exception to the
general prohibition against monopolies by granting a
"privilege for the term of fourteen years or under [for] the
sole working or making any manner of new manufactures
... to the.., inventor .... " Statute of Monopolies,1623, 21
Jac. 1, c.3 (Eng.), reprinted in 9 DONALD
S. CHISUM,
CHISUM
oNPATENTS,
App.8-3 (2005). Notably, that Statute eliminated
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commercial practices
exclusivity:

from the scope of patentable

[T]hose whoformulated the Constitution were
familiar with the long struggle over monopolies
so prominent in English history, where exclusive
rights to engage even in ordinary business
activities were granted so frequently by the Crown
for the financial benefits accruing to the Crown
only. It was desired that in this country any
Government grant of a monopoly for even a
limited time should be limited to those things
which serve in the promotion of science and the
useful arts.
In re Yuan, 188 E2d 377, 380 (C.C.RA. 1951) (emphasis
added). Contemporaneoususe of the term "useful art" by
the FoundingFathers further confirms that patent-eligible
subject matter is limited to technological or industrial
innovations. The term "useful arts" was used in the context
of the production of goods and the industrial, mechanical
and manualarts, days before the Constitutional Convention
of 1787 by a delegate to that Convention. 7 Likewise,
7 "Under all

the disadvantages

which have attended

manufactures and the useful arts, it must afford the most comfortable
reflection to every patriotic mind to observe their progress in the
United States and particularly
in Pennsylvania ....
Permit me
howeverto mention them under their general heads: meal of all kinds,
ships and boats, malt and distilled liquors, potash, gunpowder,
cordage, loaf-sugar, pasteboard, cards and paper of every kind, books
in various languages, snuff, tobacco, starch, cannon, musquets,
anchors, nails, and very manyother articles of iron, bricks, tiles,
potters ware, mill-stones, and other stone work, cabinet work, trunks
and Windsor chairs, carriages and harness of all kinds .... " Tench
Coxe, Delegate to the 1787 Constitutional
Convention from
Pennsylvania, An Address to an Assembly of the Friends of American
(Cont’d)

Alexander Hamilton praised the patent system as a way of
encouraging manufacturing industries and "[inventions]
which relate to machinery" in the United States. ALEXANDER
HAMILTON,THE REPORTSOF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON:REPORTON

MANUFACTURES
(Dec. 5, 1791) 115-16, 175-76 (Jacob
Cooke ed., Harper & Row1964).
Consistent with the constitutional foundation, the current
patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101, provides:
Whoeverinvents or discovers any newand useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, mayobtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirementsof this title.
This Court has long held that the first three categories
enumerated in section 101 -- machines, manufactures and
compositions of matter -- refer to physical products.
The Court has defined the term "machine"in section 101 to
mean"a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain
devices and combinationof devices." Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 531,570 (1864). "’Manufacture’" in section
means "’the production of articles for use from raw or
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms,
(Cont’d)
Manufactures: Convened for the Purpose of Establishing a Society
for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts, Read
in the University of Pennsylvania, on Thursday the 9th of August
1787, 17-18 (R. Aitkin & Son 1787) (emphasis added); see also
Joseph Barnes, Treatise on the Justice, Policy, and Utility of
Establishing an Effectual System for Promoting the Progress of
Useful Arts 4 (Francis Bailey 1792) (Patentable invention "consists
in discoveries in science, and in the useful arts; by means of which
agriculture, navigation, manufactures, and manual labor are, not only
facilitated, but muchpromoted; and, indeed, to these they owe their
present state of perfection.").
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qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by handlabor or by machinery.’" Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
"[C]omposition of matter" has been defined as "all
compositions of two or moresubstances and.., all composite
articles, whetherthey be the results of chemicalunion, or of
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids,
powdersor solids." Id.
The fourth section 101 category -- "process" -- is
defined in the patent statute as:
process, art or method,and includes a newuse of a
knownprocess, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material.
35 U.S.C. § 100(b). Although the meaning of the terms
"process, art or method"is broad on its face, this Court’s
precedent "forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101."
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); see also Diehr,
450 U.S. at 183 ("A process is a modeof treatment of certain
materials to producea given result. It is an act, or a series of
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed
and reducedto a different state or thing."). In particular, this
Court has consistently distinguished between concrete,
specific and technologically-grounded aspects of innovative
contributions, which are protectable via the patent system,
from underlyingabstract or general principles, whichare not.
In an early landmark decision regarding patentable
subject matter, O’Reilly v. Morse,56 U.S. (15 How.)62, 113
(1854), the Court revoked Morse’s eighth claim, which
recited:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific
machineryor parts of machinerydescribed in the
foregoing specification and claims; the essence
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of my invention being the use of the motive power
of the electric or galvanic current, whichI call
electro-magnetism,
however developed for
markingor printing intelligible characters, signs,
or letters,
at any distances, being a new
application of that powerof which I claim to be
the first inventor or discoverer.
Id. at 112 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that the
claim was "not warranted by law" because it wouldprotect,
and thereby prevent use of, all conceivable solutions to
accomplishthe recited result. Id. at 113.
If this claim can be maintained,it matters not by
what process or machinery the result is
accomplished. For aught that we nowknowsome
future inventor, in the onwardmarchof science,
maydiscover a modeof writing or printing at a
distance by means of the electric or galvanic
current, without using any part of the process or
combination set forth in the plaintiff’s
specification .... But yet if it is coveredby this
patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public
have the benefit of it without the permission of
this patentee.
Id. at 112-13 (emphasis added). The Court explained that
Morsewas only entitled to a patent for the methodof using
electro-magnetismto print marksor signs at a distance that
he actually invented: "he has not discoveredthat the electromagnetic current, used as a motive power, in any other
method, and with any other combination, will do as well."
Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
Twentyyears later, in Rubber-TipPencil Co. v. Howard,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874), the Court invalidated
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claim reciting a rubber eraser havinga hole to accept a pencil,
explaining "an idea of itself is not patentable, but a new
device by which it maybe madepractically useful is."
O’Reilly and Rubber-Tip Pencil are bedrock cases for
determining the patent eligibility of subject matter. In the
first instance, both cases confirmthat the patent systemdoes
not protect all types of processes nor does it protect abstract
ideas. These cases also reinforce the important policy goal
of maintaining "basic tools of scientific and technological
work" within the public domain. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S.
at 67. O ’Reilly in particular makesclear that process patents
should not be allowed to appropriate all solutions to a
problem. This Court has consistently applied the fundamental
principles announcedin O’Reilly and Rubber-Tip Pencil in
the intervening years.
Notably, in a trilogy of cases decided at the dawnof the
Information Age, the Court considered computer-related
inventions and confirmed its early precedent as applied to
newfields of endeavor. In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at
64, the patent claimed a "methodfor converting binary-coded
decimal (BCD)numerals into pure binary numerals." "The
claims were not limited to any particular art or technology,
to any particular apparatus or machinery,or to any particular
end use." Id. The claims "purported to cover any use of the
claimed methodin a general-purpose digital computerof any
type." Id.
The question presented to the Court in Gottschalk was
"whether the methoddescribed and claimed was a ’process’
within the meaningof the Patent Act." Id. After reviewing a
numberof early decisions, the Court held that the claimed
methodwas not patentable. Id. at 71-73. Muchas "one may
not patent an idea," one maynot patent the "formula for
converting BCDnumerals to pure binary numerals." Id. at
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71. "[T]he mathematical formula involved here has no
substantial practical application except in connectionwith a
digital computer, which meansthat if the judgmentbelow is
affirmed, the patent wouldwholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
algorithmitself." Id. at 71-72.
In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledgedthat
the "[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ’to a
different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a
process claim that does not include particular machines."
Id. at 70. See, e.g., ExpandedMetal Co. v. Bradford, 214
U.S. 366, 385-86 (1909) (sustaining a patent on a process
for expanding metal that involved mechanical operations).
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585 involved claims drawn
to a methodfor computing an "alarm limit" on any process
variable involved in the catalytic chemical conversion of
hydrocarbons. Whena process variable, such as temperature,
pressure, or flow rate, exceeded a predetermined "alarm
limit," an alarm signaled "an abnormalcondition indicating
either inefficiency or perhapsdanger." Id. Theonly difference
between the claimed method and the previous conventional
methods was the mathematical algorithm or formula used to
calculate the alarm limit. See id. at 585-86.
TheCourt held that the claim wasineligible for patenting
because it simply provided a formula for computing an
updated alarm limit. Id. at 594-96. The application did not
explain howto "select the appropriate marginof safety, the
weighingfactor, or any other variables .... [n]or [did] it...
contain any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at
work, the monitoring of process variables, or the means
of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system."
Id. at 586.
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Following the Gottschalk decision, the Court in Parker
confirmed that a process does not automatically fall within
the patentable subject matter of section 101 merely because
a process implements a principle or mathematical formula
in some specific fashion. See Parker, 437 U.S. at 593. To
permit otherwise "would make the determination of
patentable subject matter dependsimply on the draftsman’s
art and would ill serve the principles underlying the
prohibition against patents for ’ideas’ or phenomenaof
nature." Id. "The rule that the discovery of a law of nature
cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural
phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more
fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of
’discoveries’ that the statute wasenacted to protect." Id. An
inventive application of a mathematical formula, principle
or phenomenonof nature maybe patented, but patentability
cannot be supported "unless there is some other inventive
conceptin its application." Id. at 594.
Furthermore, the Court stated that "post-solution
activity" -- the adjustment of the alarm limit to the figure
computedaccording to the formula -- cannot "transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process." Id. at 590.
"A competent draftsman could attach some form of postsolution activity to almost any mathematical formula . . .
[however, the] concept of patentable subject matter under
§ 101 is not ’like a nose of wax which maybe turned and
twisted in any direction .... ’" Id. (quoting White v. Dunbar,
119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886)).
In Diamondv. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177, the invention was
"a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into
cured precision products." According to the patent, the
industry had been unable "to obtain uniformly accurate cures
because the temperature of the molding press could not be
precisely measured, thus makingit difficult to... determine
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cure time." Id. at 178. To overcomethis problem, the method
required, inter alia, constantly measuring the actual
temperature inside the moldand then automatically feeding
the temperature measurementsinto a computer which would
repeatedly recalculate the cure time by use of a well-known
equation. See id.
This Court held the claims to be patentable because
"a physical and chemical process for molding precision
synthetic rubber products falls within the § 101 categories
of possibly patentable subject matter." Id. at 184. Here, the
"claims were not directed to a mathematicalalgorithm or an
improved method of calculation but rather recited an
improved process for molding rubber articles by solving a
practical problemwhich had arisen in the moldingof rubber
products." Id. at 181. "[T]he transformationof an article, in
this case raw, uncuredsynthetic rubber, into a different state
or thing cannotbe disputed." Id. at 184. In fact, "[i]ndustrial
processes such as this are the types which have historically
been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws."
Id.
The Court further stated, "[a] claim drawn to subject
matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory
simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer
program, or digital computer." Id. at 187. Rather, "whena
claim containing a mathematical formula implements or
applies that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the
patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or
reducingan article to a different state or thing), then the claim
satisfies the requirementsof § 101." Id. at 192.
Onthe other hand, "laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas" are excluded from patent protection.
Id. at 185. Scientific truths, or the mathematicalexpression
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of them, are similarly outside the patent system, but "’a novel
and useful structure created with the aid of knowledgeof
scientific truth maybe [patentable].’" Id. at 188 (quoting
MackayRadio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp of Am., 306
U.S. 86, 94 (1939)).
In these and other relevant patent cases, the Court has
developed several cogent principles that constrain subject
matter patentability:
"Excluded from.., patent protection are laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
"A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamentaltruth;
an original cause; a motive;these cannot be patented,
as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right." Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,
175 (1853).
Onemaynot patent an idea. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at
71 (citing Rubber-TipPencil, 87 U.S. at 507).
"Phenomena of nature, though just discovered,
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts
are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work." Gottschalk, 409
U.S. at 67.
Mathematical algorithms are not patentable.
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186; Parker, 437 U.S. at 586;
Gottschalk, 450 U.S. at 71-72.
One cannot patent all solutions
See O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113.

to a problem.
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"’It is for the discovery or invention of some
practical methodor meansof producinga beneficial
result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for
the result or effect itself.’" Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182
n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 55 U.S. (15 How.)
252,267-68 (1854)).
Insignificant post-solution activity or limiting an
abstract idea to one technological environmentwill
not render an abstract idea patentable. See Diehr,
450 U.S. at 191-92; Parker, 427 U.S. at 590.
"A claim covers and secures a process, a machine, a
manufacture, a composition of matter, or a design,
but never the function or result of either, nor the
scientific explanation of their operation." Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373
(1996) (emphasis added).
The GravamenOf This Court’s Precedent Is That
Subject Matter Patentability
Is Restricted
To Inventions That Involve Technological
Contributions
IBMbelieves a comprehensiveunderstanding of subject
matter patentability can be deduceddirectly fromthis Court’s
precedent. Morespecifically, patentable subject matter is
restricted
to inventions that involve technological
contributions -- namely, tangible products or processes that
either (i) are tied to a particular machineor apparatus
(ii) cause transformation or reduction of an article to
different state or thing, and in either instance produce
technologically beneficial results. In summarizing this
Court’s existing standard, IBMrecognizes that the Court has
used languagesuggesting that it maynot be a definitive rule,
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but rather more akin to a presumption. 8 In the intervening
years, however, no situation has been presented to this Court
to justify an exception to this Court’s standard. This test sets
forth a reasonable and balanced standard for subject matter
eligibility.
The requirement for technological contribution is also
consistent with numerous cases of this Court, referring to
patents as properly directed toward "technology" and
"technological growth and industrial innovation." See, e.g.,
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64 ("The claims were not limited to
any particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus
or machinery, or to any particular
end use.") (emphasis
added); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184 ("Industrial processes . .
have historically been eligible to receive the protection of
our patent laws.") (emphasis added); Pfaffv. Wells, 525 U.S.
55, 63 (1998) ("the patent system represents a carefully
crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the
public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology,
in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of
time.") (emphasis added); Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,150-51 (1989) (same); Markman,
517 U.S. at 390 ("Congress created the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for patent
cases, H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20-23 (1981), observing
that increased uniformity would ’strengthen the United States
patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth
and industrial innovation.’")
(emphasis added). IBM has
been unable to find any cases from this Court that are
inconsistent with the technological contribution requirement.
8 TheGottschalkCourtstated: "It is arguedthat a processpatent
musteither be tied to a particular machineor apparatusor mustoperate
to changearticles or materialsto a ’different state or thing.’ Wedo not
hold that noprocesscouldever qualifyif it did not meetthe requirements
of our prior precedents." Gottschalk,409 U.S. at 71 (emphasisadded).
However,the Court has not undertakento define circumstanceswhere
a processoutside its precedentwouldqualify for patent protection.
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Until recent years, lower courts had also recognizedthat
patenting was confined to the "technological arts," a modern
term recognized as synonymouswith the phrase "useful arts"
as it appears in the Constitution. In re Waldbaum,457 E2d
997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Bergy, 596 E2d 952, 959
(C.C.P.A. 1979) ("We have previously pointed out that
present day equivalent of the term ’useful arts’ employedby
the Founding Fathers is ’technological arts.’") (emphasis
added), aff’d sub nom, Diamondv. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980); In re Musgrave, 431 E2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A.
1970)("All that is necessary, in our view, to makea sequence
of operational steps a statutory ’process’ within 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in
consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the
progress of ’useful arts.’") (emphasisadded).
This test is rooted in the constitutional requirementthat
patents are granted to promotethe progress of useful arts. In
historical context, the useful arts required a technological
contribution. This Court’s precedent reinforces the need for
a technological contribution for patent eligibility. A fair
reading of this Court’s precedent in the aggregate provides
the foundation for the standard that a claim to a process or
methodis not patentable unless it either (i) is tied to
particular machineor apparatus or (ii) causes transformation
or reduction of an article to a different state or thing, and in
either instance produces technologically beneficial results.
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The Decisions
Of The Federal Circuit Have
Applied An Unjustifiably
Expansive Standard
For Patent Eligibility
Of Business Methods

A specific,
and particularly
troubling, arena where
Federal Circuit rulings diverge from this Court’s precedent
is the eligibility of business methods for patenting. IBMis
concerned over patenting methods of doing business lacking
9a technical contribution.
Historically,
methods of doing business were not
patentable subject matter, 1° and the 1952 Patent Act did not
9 Examplesof abstract business methodsinclude U.S. Patent
Nos. 5,947,526 (claim 1 reciting method for tracking personal
expenditures) and 5,668,736(claim 1 reciting methodfor remodeling
an existing building).
10 See, e.g., Hotel Security CheckingCo. v. LorraineCo., 160
F. 467, 469-72 (2d Cir. 1908) ("cash-registering and accountchecking"unpatentable "system of transacting business disconnected
from the meansfor carrying out the system.... "); Ex Parte Turner,
1894 Dec. Comm’rPat. 36, 36-37 (method to secure reading of
advertisements not patentable because, inter alia, process carried
no physical effect; "a plan or theory of action which,if carried into
practice, could produce no physical results proceedingdirect from
the operation of the theory or plan itself is not an art within the
meaningof the patent laws."); Ex Parte Abraham,1869 Dec. Comm’r
Pat. 59 (method for detecting and preventing tax evasion by
employing stamps to be severed upon attachment to an article
unpatentable;"[i]t is contrary.., to the spirit of the law.., to grant
patents for methods of book-keeping .... "); Loew’s Drive-in
Theatres, Inc. v. Park-InTheatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 553(1 st Cir.
1949) (patent claiming arranging automobiles such that occupants
wouldhavean unobstructedview of a screen or stage did "not involve
an exercise of the faculty of invention"); Seagram& Sons, Inc. v.
Marzall, 180 F.2d 26, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (method for testing
beverages and like products to makeadvance determination of
(Cont’d)

21
change this principle. "Although the term ’process’ was not
added to 35 U.S.C. § 101 until 1952, a process [as shaped by
this Court’s precedent] has historically
enjoyed patent
protection because it was considered a form of ’art’ as that
term was used in the 1793 Act." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (citing
Coming, 56 U.S. (How. 15) at 267-68). In an oft-quoted
comment, Judge Rich explained that:
Section 101, entitled "Inventions patentable,"
enumerates the categories of inventions subject
to patenting. Of course, not every kind of an
invention can be patented. Invaluable though it
may be to individuals, the public, and national
defense, the invention of a more effective
organization
of the materials
in, and the
techniques of teaching a course in physics,
chemistry, or Russian is not a patentable invention
because it is outside of the enumerated[statutory]
categories .... Also outside that group is one of
the greatest inventions of our times, the diaper
service.
(Cont’d)
consumerreactions and preferencesnot "newand useful art, machine,
manufacture, or any new and useful improvementsthereof’); In re
Patton, 127 F.2d 324, 327-28 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (system of fighting
fires using standardized and interchangeablefire fighting equipment
not patentable subject matter; "a systemof transacting business, apart
from the meansfor carrying out such system, is not within... [the
patent statute] ... nor is an abstract idea or theory, regardless of its
importanceor the ingenuity with whichit was conceived, apart from
the meansfor carrying such idea or theory into effect, patentable
subject matter."); In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982, 982-83(C.C.P.A. 1934)
(methodof buying and selling stocks, wherein one party advertised
offer, another party acceptedoffer and such transaction wasrecorded,
constituted unpatentable methodof doing business); In re Sterling,
70 F.2d 910, 911-12(C.C.P.A. 1934) (patent application directed
a particular arrangementof printed matter on bank checks and stubs
not patentable subject matter).

22
Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability,
11
UMv.L. REV.393,393-94 (1960).

28 GEO.WASH.

Thedicta in the Federal Circuit decision in State Street,
however, created a dramatic sea-change in the patentability
of inchoate business methods. State Street involved a
patent generally directed to a data processing system for
implementing an investment structure which was developed
for use in Signature’s business as an administrator and
accounting agent for mutual funds. 149 E3d at 1370.
The district court invalidated the patent for failure to
claim statutory subject matter under section 101. Id.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court, ruling that
the claims were directed to patentable subject matter because
they produced a "useful, concrete and tangible result."
Id. at 1375.
[T]he transformationof data, representing discrete
dollar amounts, by a machinethrough a series of
mathematical calculations into a final share
price, constitutes a practical application of a
mathematicalalgorithm, formula, or calculation,
because it produces "a useful, concrete and
tangible result" -- a final share price momentarily
fixed for recording and reporting purposes and
even accepted and relied upon by regulatory
authorities and in subsequenttrades.
Id. at 1373.
While the Federal Circuit’s holding in State Street
regarding the claim at issue can be justified, IBMbelieves
11JudgeRichwasoneof the principledrafters of the 1952Patent
Act as well as a Judgeof the Courtof Customsand Patent Appeals
and the Courtof Appealsfor the FederalCircuit from1957to 1999.
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that dicta in the decision ignited the explosion of nontechnological business method patents seen today. The
Federal Circuit concluded that the claim was drawn to a
system, not a methodof doing business, and it included a
numberof structural elements as limitations -- thus, the
claimed invention was a machinethat implementeda process.
However,the expansivedicta in State Street are inconsistent
with this Court’s precedent. See, e.g., id. at 1375("Wetake
this opportunityto lay this ill-conceived exception[i.e., that
business methodsare not patentable] to rest.").
In the context of business methods, the broad dicta in
State Street have reduced the historically separate subject
matter requirementof section 101 to a mere"practical utility"
determination. State Street, 149 E3d at 1375 ("The question
of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter
should not focus on which of the four categories of subject
matter a claim is directed to -- process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter -- but rather on the
essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular,
its practical utility.") (emphasisadded).
The contrast in approach is clearly evident from this
Court’s precedent. In Parker v. Flook, for example,the case
turned "entirely on the proper construction of § 101 of the
Patent Act, whichdescribes the subject matter that is eligible
for patent protection." 437 U.S. at 588. Whether subject
matter is eligible for patenting is an entirely separate inquiry
from whether the claimed invention provides some useful
result, i.e., whetherit meetsthe separate utility requirement
of section 101. See id.
Nodecision of this Court supports the broad proposition
that merely becausea methodyields a useful result it should
ipsofacto be eligible for patenting, as is the current standard
applied by the Federal Circuit. Rather, this Court has
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recognizedthat the utility requirementof 35 U.S.C.§ 101 is a
distinct and separate test from the eligibility requirementof
section 101. Amere"useful result" standardis muchtoo lenient
to determinewhethersubject matter is eligible for patenting.
As Judge Rich so aptly stated decades ago, the diaper service
(prior to the advent of disposablediapers) wasundoubtedlyone
of the greatest business creations in its day, invaluable to
countlessindividuals. However,
despite its usefulness, the diaper
service doesnot fall withinone of the four enumerated
categories
of section 101. See Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability,
28 GEO.WASh.UNIV.L. REV.393, 39394(1960).
Thestandard espousedin State Street merelyaddresses the
usefulness of the outcome.See State Street, 149 E3dat 1375.
This standard is at odds with the principles of patentability
established by the Constitution and this Court and the ambit of
patentable subject matter as established in the 1952Patent Act.
Ignoring the enumeratedcategories of statutory subject matter
as a thresholdinquiry of patentability makesthe categories mere
drafting protocols. See Parker, 437U.S. at 590(cautioning that
a competentdraftsmencould attach somepost-solution activity
to "transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable
process" within section 101).
AlthoughState Street purported to quote from Diehr that
"anythingunder the sun madeby manis patentable," that quote
was taken out of context. State Street, 149 E3d at 1373.
Congressionalreports employedthat phrase only with respect
to machinesand manufactures.See S. R~. No. 82-1979, at 2399
(1952) ("A person may have ’invented’ a machine or
manufacture,whichmayinclude anything under the sun that is
madeby man,but it is not necessarily patentable under section
101unless the conditionsof the title are fulfilled."); H. R. REp.
No. 82-1923(1952) (same). Certainly, section 101 does not
"anything under the sun madeby man" is patentable subject
matter, but rather references four specific categories.
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Acquiescing to the demands of patent applicants and the
State Street dicta, the USPTOhas now dramatically
changed
course as well. Thus, for example, the USPTO recently
promulgated "interim guidelines"
stating that an invention
need not lie within the "technological
arts" to be patented.
Official Gazette of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 12
1300 O.G. 142, No. 4 (Nov. 22, 2005).
Issued patents from such diverse areas as architecture,
athletics,
insurance, painting, psychology, and the law itself,
reveal just how far afield the patent system has gone in
granting patents in virtually
any area of human endeavor,
such as teaching a golf putting stroke or a method for lifting
13
a box.

~2 In reaction to the sweeping impact of State Street, Congress
passed the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 273,
to provide a defense to infringement of a business method patent if
the accused infringer "had, acting in good faith, actually reduced
the subject matter to practice at least 1 year before the effective
filing date of such patent, and commercially used the subject matter
before the effective filing date of such patent." First Inventor Defense
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified as
amendedat 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000)). Beyond that limited purpose,
there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest Congressintended
to make any other changes to the United States patent laws. Thus,
this Court’s precedent on section 101 patent eligibility for business
methods -- as articulated in the Gottschalk-Parker-Diehr trilogy -remains the controlling standard.
~3 See, e.g., U.S. Patents Nos. 5,498,162 ("Method For
Demonstrating a Lifting Technique"), 6,447,403 ("Method and
Apparatus for Improving Putting Skill"), 6,912,510 ("Methods
Exchanging an Obligation"),
5,190,458 ("Character Assessment
Method"), and 5,809,484 ("Method and Apparatus For Funding
Education By Acquiring Shares of Students Future Earnings").
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NO SOUND INNOVATION POLICY SUPPORTS
PATENTS ON NON-TECHNOLOGICAL METHODS
OF DOING BUSINESS
Not only is an unrestricted sense of patentable subject
matter disfavored by sound innovation policy, it conflicts
with the requirement, stipulated by the Constitution and
consistently articulated by this Court’s precedent, that
patentable subject matter must fall within the "useful arts."
A. Patent-Based Incentives Are Not Needed To Spur
Business Method Innovation
Thedecision to issue patents on particular subject matter
involves, in the words of ThomasJefferson, a determination
of those "’things which are worth to the public the
embarrassmentof an exclusive patent .... ’" Grahamv. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
In this regard, the evidence suggesting a sudden need
for patent-based incentives to promote the developmentof
business concepts is conspicuous by its absence. "Nowhere
in the substantial literature on innovationis there a statement
that the United States economysuffers from a lack of
innovation in methods of doing business. Comparedwith
the business practices of comparable economieswe seem to
be innovators .... " Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank
Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection
for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL.PROP.,
MEDIA
& ENT.L.J. 61, 92 (1999). Amongthe reasons for the
persistent favorable record of commercialentrepreneurship
in the United States are existing federal and state regimes,
including unfair competition law, trade secrets, copyright,
and the misappropriation doctrine, that have long policed
free riding and allowed business pioneers to reap the rewards
of their ideas. See id. at 93. In conjunctionwith market-based
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incentives, including the desire to seize first-mover and
learning-curve advantages, the current legal frameworkhas
resulted in a flourishing environmentfor business innovation
in the United States. Noplausible argumentsupports the view
that protecting non-technological business methodsthrough
our patent systemis neededto solve a marketfailure problem,
fill a legal void, or ultimately enhancesocial welfare.
B.

Business Method Patenting Raises Significant
Competitive Concerns

Althoughno convincing justification exists for allowing
patents on non-technological methodsof doing business and
other abstract ideas, the breadth of coverageof such patents
has raised significant competitive concerns. Amongthem is
that such patents are not restricted by the Constitution and
the precedent articulated by this Court. Rather, they may
effectively appropriate all possible solutions to a particular
problem.This direct restraint uponthe ability of competitors
to develop alternatives to the patented invention thwarts a
principal aspiration of the patent system, fostering new
alternatives. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. KinkeadIndus., Inc.,
932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Designing around
patents is, in fact, one of the waysin whichthe patent system
works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress
in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose."); Brennerv.
Manson,383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) ("Until [a] process claim
has been reduced to production of a product shown to be
useful, the metes and boundsof that monopolyare not capable
of precise delineation. It mayengross a vast, unknown,and
perhaps unknowablearea.").
Consider, for example, the ubiquitous automatedteller
machine ("ATM"). A review of the patent rolls reveals
numerous ATMpatents concerning such mechanical,
electrical, and computer-implemented inventions as card
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readers, touch screens, cash dispensers, statement printers,
and antitheft mechanisms. As evidenced by the robust
competition within the contemporary ATMindustry, such
patents have both preserved the incentives of industry
participants to innovate, yet allowed their competitors to
market alternative designs. However,in view of the Federal
Circuit’s endorsement of patents on inchoate business
methods,a contemporaryinventor’ s claim to the very concept
of an ATM
would be considered eligible for patenting under
section 101. Muchlike claim 8 of Morse’s telegraphy patent,
such a patent would effectively prevent all others from
designing alternative mechanisms for meeting the same
marketplace needs. The potential adverse impact of this
hypothetical patent upon competition not just in the ATM
industry, but within the bankingindustry itself, is apparent.
The lack of a plausible justification for patents on
abstract business methodsand humanbehavior, coupled with
the anticompetitive consequencesof issuing these patents,
counsels that this Court continueto restrict patentable subject
matter to instantiated products and processes. Modern
society’s dizzying pace of technological change, with its
accompanying changes to marketplace conditions and
commercial practices,
should by no means lead to an
alteration of these established principles.
Nor does this Court’s recognition that the patent system
should keep apace with unforeseeable fields of scientific or
technological discovery, see Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 31516, compela contrary result. Abstract business concepts are
not an unforeseeablefield, and, in fact, they long predate the
patent system. See, e.g., John R. Thomas,The Patenting of
the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C.L. REV. 1139, 1145-46
(1999). Moreover,by definition, abstract or inchoate business
methods are not scientific or technological. See Malla
Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method
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Patents: CommonSense, Congressional Consideration, and
Constitutional History, 28 RUT6ERS
CoMe.& TECH.L.J. 61,
77-78 (2002).
In State Street, the Federal Circuit articulated broadsweeping dicta without makingan inquiry into whether the
patenting of inchoate methods of doing business raises
competitive concerns and whether traditional patent-based
incentives were actually needed to spur methods of doing
business. "Jefferson sawclearly the difficulty in ’drawinga
line between the things which are worth to the public the
embarrassmentof an exclusive patent, and those which are
not.’" Graham,383 U.S. at 9. This Court should return the
ambit of patentable subject matter to that range of innovation
which truly justifies tolerating the "embarrassmentof an
exclusive patent."
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CONCLUSION
Shouldthe Court decide to address the issues of subject
matter eligibility for business methods,for all the foregoing
reasons, the Court should hold that patentable subject matter
under section 101 is restricted to inventions that involve
technological contributions -- namely, tangible products or
processes that either (i) are tied to a particular machine
apparatus or (ii) cause transformation or reduction of
article to a different state or thing, and in either instance
producetechnologically beneficial results.
Respectfully submitted,
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